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Meeting a friend in a corridor, Wittgenstein said: "Tell me,
why do people always say it was natural for men to assume
that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth
was rotating?" His friend said, "Well, obviously, because it
just looks as if the sun is going round the earth." To which
the philosopher replied, "Well, what would it have looked like
if it had looked as if the earth was rotating?"1
If judges were bringing to property-rights adjudication the
same system of thought they bring to free-speech adjudication,
what would our constitutional doctrine of property look like? I
think the answer (for better or for worse) must be the same as the
one invited by Wittgenstein's mind teaser: The doctrine would
look like ... what it looks like.
Is Professor Richard Epstein saying differently?2 It would be
surprising if he were, because insistence on the pull toward unity
in constitutional thought has been a consistent mark and strength
of Professor Epstein's scholarship. In Property, Speech, and the
Politics of Distrust, Professor Epstein does say that if we would
only carry over into Takings Clause analysis the "doctrinal struc-
tures," organizing "presuppositions," and "dominant tendencies"
of First Amendment adjudication, we would greatly change the law
of Takings.3 But this is no claim of deep disjuncture between Tak-
ings adjudication and First Amendment adjudication as we find
them conducted today. Rather, Professor Epstein looks past the
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. This Article was prepared for The Bill of
Rights in the Welfare State: A Bicentennial Symposium, held at The University of Chicago
Law School on October 25-26, 1991. It is heavily indebted to Ed Baker, Peggy Radin, and
Fred Schauer, both for comments on a prior draft and for scholarship on which it relies.
Perhaps its most extended indebtedness (acknowledged in the title and by one, lonesome
citation) is to the teaching of John Rawls that the question of liberty, insofar as it has
anything to do with justice, is inseparable from the question of distribution.
Tom Stoppard, Jumpers 75 (Faber and Faber, 1972) (emphasis in original).
2 Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U Chi L Rev
41 (1992).
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surface confusions of the moment ("through the eyes," as he says,
"of a cautious libertarian"4 ) to immanent, normative foundations
of First Amendment law. Finding these -deeper inspirations not al-
ways honored in contemporary practice, Epstein urges that their
full restoration to constitutional law would return that
law-including First Amendment law-to a sound condition.5
By Professor Epstein's standards, the state of constitutional
law today is one of corruption and decline. First Amendment law is
not exempt. Epstein thinks, however, that First Amendment law
can be made to yield a corrective model for Takings doctrine be-
cause it is comparatively less decayed, and therefore a better initial
guide to recovery and 'reconstruction of sound constitutional rea-
son. Foremost among the normative impulses he finds better pre-
served there is distrust, "the sense that government is a necessary
evil.' ' 6 Professor Epstein, as usual, argues his case with vigor and
rigor. As usual, illumination results. We see normative shapes,
structures, symmetries-contestable as many of us find
them-where before we had not glimpsed their possibility.
There is, though, such a thing as blinding light, the flood of
incandescence that washes out of perception not just the small de-
tails but the structural fixtures of the scene before us. Part II of
this Article warns against letting the light of distrust theory wash
out main features of our constitutional landscape. It contends that
among the fixtures of First Amendment doctrine that Professor
Epstein agrees must limit any reconstructive "internal adjust-
ment" of the doctrine7 is one-the comparatively free pass for "in-
cidental" restrictions of speech-that simply will not allow for can-
onization of distrust as the surpassing precept of American
constitutionalism.
Section I takes more direct issue with Professor Epstein's well-
known recommendations for greatly tightened judicial review of le-
gal regulation of proprietary and economic liberties. Rather than
treating contemporary constitutional law's elevation of free speech
rights over property rights as a sign of decadence, I start with the
thought that this practice strikes most people as making some kind
of functional sense. Without claiming (or believing) that today's
practice is above reproach, I describe a set of normative premises
' Id at 47.
5 Id at 46.
6 Id at 47.
7 Id at 44.'
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that the general shape of this practice seems designed to carry out,
and claim that these premises are good ones.
We begin with commonplaces. The Constitution contemplates
lawmaking. It entrusts to lawmakers a range of legislative discre-
tion. It does so, we have to presume, out of a regard for justice and
welfare. 8 Presumably out of a like regard, the Constitution also es-
tablishes certain rights and otherwise limits lawmakers' discretion
to make laws. The Constitution calls upon courts of law to help
effectuate these rights9 and other limits'0 on lawmaker discretion,
by adjudicating claims of transgression. Yet it also calls upon the
courts, in their adjudications, to support and defend the discre-
tionary authority of lawmakers."
Between discretion and limits, discretion and rights, courts are
to hold the balance true.' 2 But if there is a true balance, can there
be more than one? Why should courts have multiple sets of scales
and calipers in use: "strict" scrutiny in some cases, "loose" scru-
tiny in others, various "intermediate" scrutinies in still others, de-
pending upon which rights are in question? How can our courts
presume to give different protection to Fifth Amendment property
rights than to First Amendment expression rights? That is our
question.' 3
In this Article, I advance for consideration a loosely policy-
analytic answer to this question, relying on a broadly functionalist,
or consequentialist, argument. I make no claim that this kind of
argument can stand by itself as a complete and sufficient response
to any large question of political morality or legitimacy. Yet, I be-
lieve, most would consider such an argument an indispensable sup-
port for other forms of political justification. Suppose that we can-
not discover any policy-motivated, functional reason for such a
quirky-looking practice as methodically stricter judicial review
under the Free Speech Clause than under the Takings Clause of
8 See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton, 1988). The entrustment may
be misguided-a question we shall be considering-but the fact of entrustment and its pre-
sumptively benign intention seem undeniable.
See Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958).
See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheaton) 316 (1819).
12 See id at 423.
's My response to the question follows some, but not all, of the leads furnished in Pro-
fessor C. Edwin Baker's more elaborate response to "those ... who claim that a principled
justification has never been given for distinguishing currently protected individual liberties
from currently unprotected, or minimally protected, economic or property rights." C. Edwin
Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U Pa L Rev
741, 742 (1986).
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one and the same Bill of Rights. The inability to do so will tend to
undermine other arguments-such as that natural law requires the
quirky practice, that the Framers intended it, that hypothetical so-
cial contractors would adopt it, or- even that our society's evolved
wisdom and usage contain it.
If I have done my work correctly, and you do not find persua-
sive force in what follows, it will be because you reject certain nor-
mative assumptions I have had to build into the functionalist argu-
ment in order to make it work. In that case, my effort's value for.
you will have been to help make clear precisely what is questiona-
ble about a constitutional policy of "'strict scrutiny' for speech,
'loose scrutiny' for property."
I. LIBERTIES AND INTERESTS
To value human freedom is both to interpret and to value
human interest; it is to construe freedom as a human good. To
value particularly defined "liberties" is to value interests more spe-
cifically distinguished-interests we may attribute to individuals
whose liberties are in question, to others standing in particular re-
lations to those individuals, or to the public at large. Consider,
now, how American constitutional lawyers talk about liberty. We
regularly speak not simply of liberty, but of various liberties. We
speak of religious liberties, expressive liberties, economic and pro-
prietary liberties. We thus classify liberties by function. Which la-
bel we use depends on just what it is we have in mind that a per-
son may or may not be at liberty to do. It depends, in other words,
on what sorts of interests are at stake.
Now, this way of speaking is no accident. It seems we must
understand constitutional liberties as comprising certain kinds of
interests, as long as we understand the Constitution as a deliberate
human act. When people designedly write protections for liberties
into their constitution, they must be doing so out of desire to pro-
tect corresponding interests. Why else would they do it? 4
" To take this position is neither to overlook nor to downgrade the expressive aspect of
the practice of recognizing and respecting human rights, or the centrality of this practice to
moral justification of political authority. See, for example, Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at 780-81
(cited in note 13). It is just to insist that the expressive value or moral "point" of respect for
liberty would evaporate if we lacked a strong and steady sense of liberty's close connection
with interest.
To take this interest-conscious view of liberty is also not necessarily to exclude from
constitutional practical reason the use of "formal" conceptions of liberty that flatly rule out
certain ways of collectively promoting the value of liberty for all. Compare id at 744 (observ-
ing that "[clonstitutional interpretation inevitably is either explicitly or implicitly animated
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With that for a premise, we easily reach the first, very general
point of my argument: given such an interest-based classification
of liberties, there may well be good reasons for agents charged with
protecting the liberties to look beyond formal symmetries, and ac-
cord different forms and degrees of protection to different classes
of liberties. Judges are such agents. Their protection takes the
form of more-or-less censorious review of laws infringing on liber-
ties of one or another class. There should be no great surprise in
finding variation in the forms and degrees of such review, depend-
ing on which classes of liberty are in question. These variations
may be an intelligent response to perceived, relevant differences
among the interests corresponding to the various classes of liber-
ties of which we speak.
A. Liberty Interests: Intrinsic Value
The interests corresponding to expressive liberties are those in
people's freedom from government control over what they say and
over how, when, and where they say it. The interests corresponding
to economic liberties are those in people's freedom from govern-
ment control over their choices and modes of productive activity
and investment. The interests corresponding to proprietary liber-
ties are those in people's freedom from government control over
their retention, use, and disposition of lawfully obtained holdings
of wealth.1"
Ever since the celebrated Footnote 4,16 theorists have consid-
ered whether stricter judicial protection for some liberties than for
others can be justified by showing how the some have intrinsically
deeper libertarian 17 or civic's value than the others. That will not
by value concerns"), with id at 777, 780-81 (granting the force of "pragmatic" critiques of
libertarian formalism but also advocating formalistic exclusion of liberty-optimizing meth-
ods that violate individual autonomy).
5 Baker enumerates the interests corresponding to proprietary and economic liberties
as interests in the use of things, welfare-maintenance, personhood, protection against ex-
ploitation by others, allocation (facilitating acquisition and exchange), and sovereignty
(power over others). Id at 744-53. For good measure, he then adds privacy, recognition and
development of values, and decentralization of social power. Id at 753-54.
"6 United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152-53 n 4 (1938).
17 See, for example, David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (Oxford,
1986); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591 (1982); Louis
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum L Rev 1410 (1974); David A.J. Richards, Free
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U Pa L
Rev 45 (1974).
"8 See, for example, Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Gov-
ernment 1-3 (Harper & Brothers, 1948); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review 75-98, 105-16 (Harvard, 1980).
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be precisely the line of argument here. For present purposes, we
can stipulate that people's freedom to say what they please is no
more foundational to personal or societal fulfillment than are their
proprietary securities or their freedoms of choice in productive en-
deavors, 9 and, further, that there is no historical American con-
sensus that they are.2 °
B. "Negative" Liberties
We may further take it as given (for this occasion only) that
American constitutional law knows only "negative" and not "posi-
tive" liberties, and knows even these negative liberties only as
against the state and not as against nongovernmental agents.
American constitutional lawyers regularly and sharply differentiate,
liberty from empowerment. We know the conceptual difference be-
tween being at liberty to speak and having the ability and re-
sources with which to speak effectively. The prevailing view is that
our Constitution by and large guarantees only the liberties, not the
abilities or resources;2 and, further, that it guarantees relief only
against infringements by governments, and not by private agents.22
19 See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry ch 4 (Cambridge,
1982); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1,
14-15 n 67, 78-79; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 25 (1971).
20 See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Con-
stitutionalism (Chicago, 1990). From the standpoint of civic interest, proprietary "indepen-
dence" was historically regarded in America as foundational to good citizenship. See, for
example, Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
Entitlements, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 37, 37 (1990); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs.
Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L Rev 1319, 1327-34 (1987).
Perhaps there is one class of freedoms that have arguably occupied such a consensually
preferred status in American political thought-the freedoms of conscience and religious
profession.
21 See, for example, David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53
U Chi L Rev 864 (1986) (recognizing limited exceptions to the primarily negative nature of
American constitutional rights).
22 These two limits-the negative nature of constitutional rights and the state action
rule-are logically connected. See, for example, DeShaney v Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services, 489 US 189 (1989). If the Constitution guaranteed protection of my
negative liberty of speech against your interference (as a private citizen), it would by the
same token grant me an affirmative claim against the government to: (1) prosecute you for
interfering; (2) prevent you from interfering; or (3) guarantee me the resources to prevent
you from interfering myself. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation
Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1973 Duke L J 1153, 1195-96. For
an example of the second alternative, see Robins v Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal 3d
899, 592 P2d 341 (1979), aff'd, Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74 (1980)
(ordering property owner to refrain from denying access to persons exercising free expres-
sion rights guaranteed by California constitution).
[59:91
Constitutional Method
C. Existence vs. Value of a (Negative) Liberty
Thus we readily distinguish between two types of putative
constitutional entitlements. We find it natural to think that people
do have constitutional entitlements to be free from certain intru-
sions and restraints by the state, but simultaneously that people
do not have corresponding constitutional entitlements to the
state's assurance of access to the means of using and enjoying this
freedom. Conceptually, we have no trouble with this conjunction of
having and not having. It is perfectly conceptually possible for a
negative liberty against the state to exist as pure entitlement, re-
gardless of the holder's access to the means of enjoyment. From
this standpoint of pure entitlement against the state, a well-de-
fined negative liberty has only the one dimension of existence/non-
existence.2 3 However-and here is a crux of my argument-matters
are not so simple when we regard negative liberties from the stand-
point of interests. In an interest-sensitive view, constitutionally
guaranteed liberties are not simply formal entitlements, such that
we either have them or we don't, and that is all there is to be said.
Instead, liberties then also take on practical dimensions of magni-
tude and value. 24 To illustrate, imagine for a moment that proprie-
tary liberties are absolute. Then my proprietary liberty would pre-
sumptively be worth more than that of a broke and homeless
fellow citizen; there is a clear sense in which I stand to lose more
than he does by a general revocation or restriction of proprietary
liberties.
23 If constitutional negative liberty were construed as an entitlement in rem-good
against all agents-then distributions of legal property holdings would determine the scopes
of such liberty accruing to various persons. To speak of property distribution would, then,
be to speak of the distribution of negative liberty itself. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness
and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L Rev 295, 302-08 (1991). However, constitutional
negative liberty is construed as running only against the state. Therefore, we cannot speak
of property distribution as affecting the scope of constitutional liberty any person has
(since, under suitably general laws, rich and poor alike will have exactly identical rights to
be left unmolested by the state). We can, however, still speak of property distribution as
affecting the values of these rights to various persons.
24 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 204 (Harvard, 1971):
[L]iberty and the worth of liberty are distinguished as follows: liberty is represented by
the complete system of the liberties of equal citizenship, while the worth of liberty to
persons and groups is proportional to their capacity to advance their ends within the
framework the system defines.
See also Waldron, 39 UCLA L Rev at 317 (cited in note 23) ("If we value freedom. ..
because of the importance of choice. . . . then that value ought to lead us to pay attention"
to what choices people actually have.).
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D. The Systemic Character of Liberty Under Law
A constitution is a rule of law. To speak of liberties estab-
lished by a rule of law is to speak of a general scheme of liberties
for all;2" it is to invite the question of distribution.26 Given that the
reason for protecting liberties is regard for the corresponding inter-
ests, a constitutional scheme of liberties cannot reasonably or law-
fully blind itself to the distributive relations of the liberty interests
that it cherishes and, in a sense, creates. And given further that
these liberty interests have dimensions of value, the scheme cannot
reasonably blind itself to the configurations of the values-the dis-
tributions of the values among persons-of these liberty inter-
ests.27 It cannot disregard either the fairness of these distributions
or their social-systemic ramifications.
This is not (as you may be thinking) to admit judicial enforce-
ment of "positive" rights through the back door. Constitutional
concern with the fair values of negative liberties-as-interests need
not involve judicially enforceable entitlements to government aid.
Such a concern may rather lead to judicial respect for government
actions designed to provide aid, or otherwise ensure the fair value
of liberty-perhaps even sometimes when such actions infringe lib-
erties; it may be manifested in what courts will recognize as ade-
quate justification for. liberty-infringing actions.28 Such a concern is
arguably manifest, for example, when the Supreme Court upholds
laws prohibiting political speech funded by general treasury assets
of business corporations, on the theory that government may pre-
25 See Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment,
14 UCLA L Rev 428, 432 (1967) ("Freedom of speech is indivisible; unless we protect it for
all, we will have it for none.").
26 See Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal
Liberty, 65 St John's L Rev 119, 154-58 (1991). See particularly id at 154 ("The idea of
equality is built into the structure of the first amendment. Free speech is guaranteed not
just to one ... class of speakers but by simple inference to all speakers.").
" Compare Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at 746 (cited in note 13):
[W]hen a community possesses the productive capacity to supply all of its members
with the resources it considers as prerequisites to meaningful life, but adopts property
rules that deny those resources to some, then ... [t]his subordination, this denial of
the worth of those left without, is inconsistent with any social system premised on
respecting people as equals.
2 Some recent scholarship proposes that the "government interests" allowed by courts
to justify legislative infringements of prima facie constitutional rights ought themselves to
be understood as manifestations of rights, or of values of equivalent import with rights.
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 BU L Rev 917 (1988).
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vent certain "distortions" in the political system of expressive
liberty.29
E. Negative Liberty Interests: Scarcity and Distribution
1. Proprietary liberty.
Look, now, at constitutional proprietary liberty. It comprises
the interest people have in freedom from government control over
wealth; inextricably, it comprises the power that goes with wealth.
The "interest" and its "value" are practically and conceptually in-
separable. The interest in proprietary liberty is just the interest in
maintaining proprietary value (or power).
In a capitalist order, one person's proprietary value (or power)
is obviously relative to other people's.30 A constitutional system of
proprietary liberty is, therefore, incomplete without attending to
the configurations of the values of various people's proprietary lib-
erties. The question of distribution is endemic in the very idea of a
constitutional scheme of proprietary liberty. Thus, it can by no
means be said of laws aimed at nothing but property distributions
that they are ipso facto antithetical to that idea.31 Richard Epstein
agrees, up to the point of exempting rich-to-poor transfers, fi-
nanced by system-wide general taxes, from presumptive invalidity
as uncompensated takings of property.3 2 However, I mean to press
the argument a good deal further.
A constitutional scheme of proprietary liberty, we said, is in-
complete without attention to the distribution of wealth. Let us
now add that such a scheme can hardly ignore qualitative distinc-
tions among wealth holdings. 3 Thus, most Americans would see at
least an arguable issue of justice in the question of distribution be-
tween the possessory solitudes of shorefront second-home owners
and the general public's freedom of movement along the sea-
" Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S Ct 1391, 1396-98 (1990).
30 See, for example, Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at 788-90 (cited in note 13).
31 Baker similarly argues for the necessity (despite the difficulty) of distinguishing be-
tween laws that "restrict liberty" and laws that "allocate and demarcate the boundaries of
decisionmaking authority" and thereby "establish[] the framework within which liberty ex-
ists." "An acceptable formal conception of liberty," says Baker, requires "a set of allocation
rules." Id at 780.
32 Epstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 88 (cited in note 2).
" See Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at 744 (cited in note 13) ("[T]he first function of prop-
erty rules is to protect use values."). Among legal theorists, Margaret Jane Radin has done
the most to clarify this point. See, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent
Control, 15 Phil & Pub Aff 350 (1986); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
Stan L Rev 957 (1982).
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shore.3 4 Likewise, many doubtless see issues of justice in questions
of distribution between commercial landlords' profits and residen-
tial tenants' living conditions 5 (and also believe that there are cir-
cumstances in which residential renter-protection laws can effec-
tively respond to these issues"). In the sight of such qualitatively
discriminating, pragmatic appraisals, fairness in the constitutional
scheme of proprietary liberties will sometimes call for laws whose
restrictions fall unevenly on various kinds of property holdings.
3 7
Such issues of proprietary justice may, moreover, be so con-
text- and culture-dependent that they are unfit for resolution at
the level of abstraction and fixity at which the text of a strongly
entrenched, rarely amendable bill of rights must speak. The princi-
ple of respect for property is a core commitment of American con-
stitutionalism, but the contours of protection have always through-
out our history been wrapped in controversy. s Perhaps this is
because the contours have always been in flux. Property-the
claim to security of possession or entitlement-is significantly a
matter of justified expectation, and expectation is at bottom a
"cultural possession."3 9 It is certainly true that our culture justifies
attaching a degree of expectation to extant positive laws, but in a
common-law based "culture of property," the possibility of change,
of evolution, is "always understood."40 For these or other reasons, a
See Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825, 847-48, 856-58, 863-64 (1987)
(Brennan dissenting).
11 Compare Margaret Jane Radin, Diagnosing the Takings Problem, in John H. Chap-
man, ed, Compensatory Justice (Nomos XXXIII) 248, 257 (New York, 1991) ("Takings
Problem") ("Home-ownership carries greater moral weight in the legal system than does
ownership of vacant land held for investment.").
36 See, for example, Radin, 15 Phil & Pub Aff 350 (cited in note 33); Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md L Rev 563, 610-14 (1982).
'" The distributive impacts of such restrictions would deviate from population-wide
proportionality or progressivity relative to numerary net income or net worth. Thus they
would fail the test adumbrated by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Pennell v City
of San Jose, 485 US 1, 21-24 (1988), and in his prevailing opinion in Nollan, 483 US 825, at
least as some read it. See, for example, Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the
Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum L Rev 1630, 1650-52 (1988).
See Radin, Takings Problem at 248-49, 265 (cited in note 35).
Margaret Jane Radin, Evaluating Government Reasons For Changing Property Re-
gimes (forthcoming) ("Regimes"). See also Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the
Constitution-116-18 (Yale, 1977) (distinguishing between "social property" and "legal prop-
erty" and emphasizing importance of the former).
"I Radin, Regimes (cited in note 39). For example, in criticizing Nollan, 483 US 825,
Radin persuasively describes (and documents) the recent "culture of private property ... on
the west coast" as evidently
evolving toward an understanding that beaches are a special resource not treated the
same as ordinary objects of property... The cultural understanding seemed to be that
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democratic constitution may well leave the precise contours of
property protection, or some of them, to ongoing political hammer-
ing-out within rather broad limits.4
2. Economic liberty.
Very much the same is true of economic liberties, people's
freedoms from government control over choices of productive en-
deavor or investment. These freedoms and their fair values are ob-
viously, in practice, socially interdependent. If major corporate em-
ployers relocate their workplaces, or refuse to allow women to work
on certain jobs, the displaced workers or excluded women retain
their economic liberties (conceived as legal entitlements against
the state), but the values of these liberties may be gravely im-
paired. If the government seeks to protect these values by restrict-
ing such employer actions or policies, then the values of a quite
different class of economic liberties, those of actual and prospec-
tive investors in the regulated employer firms, suffer.42 As a general
matter, it seems quite likely that holding the values of economic
liberties in reasonable adjustment will call for considerable regula-
tory control over the manner in which such liberties are
exercised.43
the stereotyped private property regime, with its broad discretion of owners to control
use and exclusion was, with respect to this particular resource, wrong.
Id. See also Radin, Takings Problem at 252 (cited in note 35) ("In some more environmen-
tally conscious future, [decisions denying compensation for highly restrictive wetlands regu-
lation] could come to appear easy."); Elizabeth V. Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal
Property Rights, 31 Buff L Rev 635, 646-48 (1982) (describing "voluntarist" strain in early
American property law that favored direct use of resources by owners and recognized au-
thority of communities to realign titles to correspond with personal need and desire to culti-
vate); Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitu-
tion 13-36 (Kansas, 1985) (describing American formative-era, common-law understanding
of property rights as fluid, relational, and regulable according to changing conceptions of
public interest).
"I See, for example, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and
Equality 68-83 (Basic, 1983); Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 Pol Theory
379, 391-92 (1981); Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at 781, 783-85 (cited in note 13).
42 No natural person's economic liberties-as distinguished from the worths of such
liberties-are directly infringed by such regulations. Of course, if we attribute liberties to
the corporations themselves, then those liberties are directly infringed by the regulations.
Compare Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 US 394, 396 (1886)
(treating corporations as "persons" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment), with First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 776 (1978) (bypassing question of "whether
corporations 'have' First Amendment rights").
" See Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at 790 (cited in note 13) (Given that many people spend
major portions of their lives in productive activity and identify themselves with what they
do, "concern for individual freedom requires that [economic] structure . . . be subject to
conscious, [collective] control.").
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In short, to repeat, we cannot broadly say that laws aimed at
nothing but modifying property distributions or regulating the
economy are inimical to the idea of a system of proprietary or eco-
nomic liberty.
3. Expressive liberty.
By contrast-and here we reach an important turning point in
the argument-we do find reason to say, of most laws aimed at
nothing but suppressing communication, that they are inimical to
the idea of a system of expressive liberty. In American constitu-
tional thought, concerns about scarcity, distribution, and value
simply have not played out in the same way for expressive liberties
as they have for economic and proprietary liberties.
It may seem peculiar, but American constitutionalists have
generally perceived the interests contemplated by, (negative) ex-
pressive liberty as non-scarce and even, in a rather special sense, as
non-competitive, as explained below. This perception arises out of
a particular set of ideas about what gives communication its con-
stitutionally estimable worth, both to individuals and to soci-
ety-ideas that impart a rather special meaning to our regnant im-
age of a marketplace of ideas.
This particular "marketplace" understanding requires that we
not measure the value of my expressive liberty in terms of either
the likelihood that I will speak or the likelihood that others will be
moved by what I say. In fact, this understanding is powerfully in-
clined against any kind of comparative assessments of the values of
various people's expressive liberties, as long as the negative liber-
ties themselves are unobstructed. Insofar as it does make such as-
sessments, the only axis of variation it recognizes is the degree to
which one's communications, once launched, have a fair, competi-
tive chance to reach others, to get through effectively to others and
receive their unobstructed attention. Once equipped with such an
understanding, American constitutionalists can plausibly maintain
that rarely is there a need to curb anyone's expressive liberty out
of a concern for the values of other people's expressive liberties;
that in general everyone can talk as much as they choose, however
they choose, about whatever they choose, to whomever they
choose, without restricting or devaluing anyone else's freedom to
communicate.
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This approach is not without serious problems.44 Nevertheless,
for committed liberals, including many committed egalitarians, it
contains a sufficient core of common sense to make it a reasonable
starting point for a constitutional doctrine of freedom of speech.
The "marketplace" approach underwrites a doctrine making highly
suspect all government actions that serve no plausible goals apart
from restricting expression and communication. Of course, such a
presumptive rule can allow for exceptional cases in which some
people's exercises of expressive freedom do adversely affect the
values of other people's expressive freedoms, defining such values
as the marketplace principle requires. 45 The easiest such cases to
recognize are those involving conflicts of "time, place, and
manner."
46
There are other cases, such as racial hate speech, in which
some people's speech arguably impairs the fair values of other peo-
ple's expressive freedoms, but in which a liberally acceptable rem-
edy is harder to fashion. It does not seem obviously mistaken to
41 Sensible people must admit that this is far from a fully realistic view. For a wide-
ranging critique, see Ingber, 1984 Duke L J 1 (cited in note 19). First, some speech can
degrade the fair value of other people's speech by simply obstructing it, as by drowning it
out. Second, some speakers and messages are able to preempt or dominate the most effec-
tive channels of communication. See id at 38-40. Doing so degrades the fair value of other
people's expressive liberties, measuring that value (just as "marketplace" theory demands)
in terms of a fair chance to command the attention of an audience. Third, it seems hard to
deny (however problematic may be the implications of admitting) that speech can degrade
the fair value of other people's speech by summoning perceptions of them (quite aside from
their messages) as human types unworthy of being heard or credited-that is, by exploiting
cultures of oppression to induce prejudgment. See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Un-
modified. Discourses on Life and Law 193-95 (Harvard, 1987); Iris Marion Young, Justice
and the Politics of Group Difference 58-61 (Princeton, 1990); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L J 431, 468-72.
11 See note 24.
4' Even their apparent simplicity may be deceptive. See, for example, C. Edwin Baker,
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 125-60 (Oxford, 1989) (criticizing such restrictions
as neither necessary nor desirable).
'7 See, for example, Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights versus Civil Liberties: The Case of
Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc Phil & Pol 81 (1991); Lawrence, 1990 Duke L J
431 (cited in note 44). There are other arguable cases of unfair impairment by some people's
speech of the value of other people's speech that a committedly liberal constitutional-legal
order may have little choice but to disregard. It may happen that less meritorious argu-
ments backed by an individual speaker's superior personal endowment of wit, chutzpah,
eloquence, or charisma gain undue advantage in the speech market over more meritorious
insights that a slower-witted, duller-spoken person has trouble articulating. See Ingber, 1984
Duke L J at 31 (cited in note 19) (questioning the assumption that "people can distinguish
rationally between a message's substance and the distortion caused by its form or focus").
However, personal handicapping in such circumstances seems not a liberally entertainable
possibility. See, for example, id at 50-55; Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at 806-07 (cited in note 13)
(explaining why "[1]egal regulation of people's use of their personal qualities to obtain
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regard these as boundary cases, for which exceptions might con-
ceivably be crafted but on which one would be ill-advised to base a
general, doctrinal approach.4"
F. Negative Liberty Interests: Interdependence and Externalities
We have seen that a constitutional scheme of liberties must
rationally concern itself with how one person's exercise of liberty X
affects the values of other people's liberty X. Of course, it must
also rationally concern itself with how one person's exercise of lib-
erty X affects the values of other people's liberties Y and Z. And
here we discover an additional reason why expressive liberties
stand on a different constitutional footing than proprietary or eco-
nomic liberties.
Plainly, some people's exercises of proprietary and economic
liberties can spill over to devalue other people's expressive liber-
ties. Reasonable adjustment will often require regulation. Political
campaign spending poses a problem of this kind. Few doubt that
the problem is real. The existence of spending on political cam-
others' participation in interactions seems intuitively offensive as an overt limitation on lib-
erty"). Again, it may happen that what an audience experiences as comparative cogency and
soundness of argument is just a reflex of the comparative familiarity or conventionality of
the ideas being urged. See, for example, Ingber, 1984 Duke L J at 25-36 (cited in note 19). If
this is at all a frequent occurrence, then public-forum doctrines of content-neutral order-
maintenance and equal access may be a recipe for ensuring that currently prevalent views
and perspectives will continue to prevail regardless of their responsiveness to the interests
and values of the audience. See id at 40-44. But by what standard can liberals deal out
"deviance" or "dissidence" subsidies? See id at 50-55.
" See Gale, 65 St John's L Rev at 158-59, 168-83 (cited in note 26). It is not, however, a
sufficient liberal response to the "hate speech" problem to point out that hate speech pro-
duces its degradation of the values of the expressive liberties of target-group members by
transmitting derogatory "ideas" about the latter. See, for example, Charles Fried, The New
First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U Chi L Rev 225, 245 (1992).
Liberals must first decide whether verbal trashings of classes of persons do significantly
prevent the intended audiences from attending to messages (claims, stories, expressions of
need, arguments) that those persons utter. If the answer is yes, then some people's speech is
seriously degrading the values of other people's expressive liberties (just as surely as the
racially discriminating employer is seriously degrading the values of some people's economic
liberties and the major polluter is seriously degrading the values of some people's proprie-
tary liberties). Liberals must then face the question of whether the degradation is so great
as to constitute as a deviation from the constitutionally contemplated system of expressive
liberties. See, for example, Robert Post,. Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amend-
ment, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 267, 312-14 (1991).
If hate speech does thus impair the fair value of expressive liberty to those who suffer
the degradation, then we have a problem on our hands that no amount of imprecation can
make go away. It is an especially thorny problem if it cannot be treated except by some kind
and degree of restriction on expressive liberty. But see id at 317 (arguing that there are a
"host of ways to address this challenge short of truncating public discourse"). Of course,
being thorny does not make the problem not a problem, either.
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paigns confirms a truth we have already established: that along
with property rights come considerations of distribution and rela-
tive values of liberties that do not, in liberal contemplation, nor-
mally arise with respect to expressive liberty strictly speaking.
Of course, spillovers can run in the reverse direction, too. Ex-
ercises of expressive liberties can affect the extent and values of
proprietary and economic liberties. Free public debate may lead to
a rent control law or a lettuce boycott. The two cases, however, are
hardly the same; the latter but not the former represents democ-
racy in action. American constitutionalism assigns a drastically su-
perior moral status to the political power of communicative per-
suasion than it does to the political power of the purse.
Just now, it seems as though a national debate may be gather-
ing over the question of government-guaranteed, universal health
care protection. Suppose that those who oppose universal health
care eventually carry the day in the chambers of government, and
people widely believe that this happened just because the oppo-
nents were able, by force of superior wealth, to outspend the pro-
ponents. Most Americans would find this result objectionable in
principle, and the objection would be precisely to the' spillover
from wealth into politics. By contrast, whatever may be objection-
able about a rent control law, the objection simply cannot be that
the law resulted from effective communicative persuasion in a
fairly conducted debate. No one will think the law objectionable
merely because free speech brought it about. If, however, the
ground for objection were that disparities in wealth between sup-
porters and opponents produced the rent-control law, then that
would be a very different case.
II. THE MYTH OF DISTRUST
A. Distrust As Universal Solvent
To this point, I have argued that functional differences be-
tween expressive liberties on the one hand, and proprietary and
economic liberties on the other, may justify more exacting judicial
scrutiny of laws restricting expression than of laws restricting pro-
prietary and economic liberties. Here is the argument, in outline:
(1) Liberties are interests, and as such they have dimensions
of value.
(2) A regime of law protecting liberty interests as human
rights must attend to the systemic relations of their values.
(3) Concern for such systemic relations requires restraint of
expressive liberty only exceptionally.
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(a) Spillovers from exercises of expressive liberty to the
values of (other people's) expressive liberties are reasona-
bly treated as exceptional.
(b) Spillovers from exercises of expressive liberty to the
values of other (nonexpressive) liberties can be substan-
tial, but there is nothing wrong with them.
(4) Concern for the systemic relations of the values of liberties
often requires substantial regulatory oversight of exercises of
proprietary and economic liberties.
(a) Spillovers from exercises of proprietary and economic
liberties to the values of sundry liberties are not only
substantial, they are often normatively problematic.
(b) The contours of the appropriate controls depend on
issues of justice that are often fairly open to political
debate.
(5) These functional differences between expressive liberties
on the one hand, and proprietary and economic liberties on
the other, can amply explain and justify a practice of excep-
tionally strict judicial scrutiny of laws directly infringing ex-
pressive liberties.
It is now time to acknowledge that this argument depends on
certain assumptions about how lawmakers go about their business.
It imagines lawmakers debating and judging, competently and in
good faith, the daunting issues of values-of-liberties and systemic
justice. Opposite assumptions about lawmaker motivation and
competence would greatly weaken the argument, perhaps to the
point of overthrowing it. If lawmakers are usually and mainly stra-
tegic self-servers, and ignorant to boot, then there is no good rea-
son for setting them loose on these daunting issues or according
them discretion to work out the issues as best they can. Conceiv-
ably, in that case, the least bad solution would be the one Profes-
sor Epstein urges: a prohibition, no less strictly enforced than the
prohibition against direct restraints of expressive liberty, against
laws that result in any net redistributions of wealth (saving ex-
press, population-wide, uniformly proportional or progressive
taxes) ."
'9 There are reasons for doubting whether Professor Epstein's is even then the least
bad solution. Among them is uncertainty about why we should place greater trust in judges
enforcing the prohibition, in what will often be highly contestable circumstances, than in
legislatures enacting laws. There is no less injustice, and no less inefficiency, in mistakenly
requiring compensation (or mistakenly frustrating government action where compensation is
refused) than in the opposite mistakes. Is it so clear that judges are more trustworthy than
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Suppose that were our conclusion. Distrust, then, would have
swamped the counsels of what would have been constitutional pru-
dence, supposing some modicum of lawmaker competence and
good faith. Distrust would have launched a preemptive strike
against constitutional practical reason. But to grant to distrust
such a preemptive force in American constitutional argument is
wrong.
B. Demythifying Distrust
A myth is not a falsehood; it is a warped truth. It is a truth
preserved but also a truth displaced, a truth inflated and hyposta-
tized, a reification. In recent American constitutional theory, the
notion of distrust has undergone something of a mythification. To
see this, all we need do is look at First Amendment doctrine-the
very body of doctrine that Professor Epstein takes as containing
the true model for American constitutional practice, from which he
thinks judicial protection for property rights (and to a less pro-
nounced degree, for free speech rights) has unfortunately strayed.
It is certainly true that current doctrine provides nothing like
sweeping protection for proprietary and economic liberties.
Neither, however, does it do so for expressive liberties. In fact,
there is a very sizeable gap between current First Amendment doc-
trine and sweeping protection of expressive freedom against gov-
ernment control. The gap I have in mind is not the doctrine's al-
lowance for exceptionally "compelling" justifications for
governmental restrictions of communicative action,50 nor is it the
doctrine's refusal or dilution of protection for expressive acts
classed as "not-speech" ("obscenity"'" and, arguably, "fighting
legislatures in determining whether, for example, a scheme of workplace safety regulation
violates any justly compensable entitlement of employer firms, or provides firms with ade-
quate "implicit in-kind compensation"? See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property
and the Power of Eminent Domain 195-216 (Harvard, 1985).
1o An example of a compelling justification is preventing imminently likely "lawless
acts." See Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969). Hans Linde argues forcefully that it
would be preferable to focus first on whether a given law categorically abridges freedom of
speech (that is, to invalidate any law "directed in terms at expression ... or [] association
for the purpose of expression"), rather than pass directly to the question of whether the
law's restrictive effects on expression are sufficiently justified by countervailing interests.
See Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Branden-
burg Concerto, 22 Stan L Rev 1163, 1174-76 (1970). There can be no doubt, however, that
the Supreme Court employs the latter approach in "subversive speech" cases.
"I See, for example, Miller v California, 413 US 15, 23 (1973).
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words" 52) or "low-value" speech ("adult" films,53 advertising54 ). I
have in mind, rather, the protection gap resulting from the doc-
trine's distinction between direct and incidental governmental in-
fringements of expressive freedom.
Current doctrine declines to treat a law (or a specific applica-
tion of a law) as constitutionally suspect just because it severely
burdens or impedes expressive acts. If the law plausibly serves un-
forbidden ends that are themselves "unrelated to the suppression
of free expression"55-if the law does not demonstrably aim at sup-
pressing conduct "precisely because of its communicative attrib-
utes" 56-then judicial protection for the "incidentally" affected
free speech interest is relatively minimal.51
The resulting gap in protection is large. Vietnam-era criminal-
ization of patently expressive draft-card burning gets by on pleas
of administrative tidiness.58 Exclusion from city utility poles of the
political campaign material of an insurgent, low-budget city-coun-
cil candidacy gets by on a plea of combatting "visual clutter." 59
(By the same reasoning, so would a total, absolute, statewide ban
on billboards.60 ) Criminalization of nude dancing in indoor estab-
" See Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571-72 (1942); Grey, 8 Soc Phil &
Pol at 91-94 (cited in note 47).
5' See Young v American Mini Theatres, 427 US 50, 70 (1976).
54 See Board of Trustees v Fox, 492 US 469, 473-78 (1989).
-5 United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 377 (1968).
" Barnes v Glen Theatre, 111 S Ct 2456, 2466 (1991) (Scalia concurring). An alterna-
tive route to strict scrutiny, fashioned on the same principle, is to show that the law pursues
its allegedly speech-independent aims in ways that discriminate against speech in general or
against particular speech. Courts will apply strict scrutiny to laws that selectively burden
speech as opposed to other activity. See Minneapolis Star v Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 US 575 (1983) (striking down special tax on publishing which state used to raise general
revenue). Courts also apply strict scrutiny to laws that selectively burden some messages or
speakers as opposed to others. See Police Department of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92
(1972) (striking down prohibition on picketing of schools except for picketing related to
labor disputes involving school).
11 If Justice Scalia has his way, it will soon be nil. See Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2463 (Scalia
concurring) ("[A]s a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expres-
sion, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all."); Employment Division v Smith,
110 S Ct 1595, 1598-1606 (1990) (Scalia) (holding that the First Amendment's bar against
laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion does not excuse anyone "from compliance with
an otherwise valid law [of general applicability] prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate").
58 O'Brien, 391 US 367.
" Members of City Council of Los Angeles v Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789, 806
(1984).
6o The Court left this question open in Metromedia, Inc. v City of San Diego, 435 US
490 (1981), but that was prior to its decisions in Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789, and
Barnes, 111 S Ct 2456.
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lishments populated by volunteer, adult customers gets by on the
plea of defending public morals."
If this is a doctrine born of distrust of lawmakers, the distrust
is very strangely selective. Actual judicial practice distrusts govern-
ment picking and choosing among things private agents can dis-
cuss or views they can express. It does not distrust government
weighing-or purporting to weigh-non-speech related goals
against freedom of speech. Thus, it does not distrust incumbent
city officials refusing the use of utility poles for insurgent political
advertising, on what might well be a pretext of aesthetic sensibil-
ity. It does not distrust the Vietnam-era Congress criminalizing
draft-card burning on a transparent pretext of administrative con-
cerns. It does not distrust a town council criminalizing nude danc-
ing in private establishments on the excuse that it must keep you
and me from prancing nude down Main Street at noon and cannot
be bothered with writing a law that distinguishes the situations.62
Now, one may well believe (as I do) that the Supreme Court
might do a much better job than it has of protecting expressive
liberties while retaining this distinction between "direct" and "in-
cidental" restrictions of expression. One may well protest the
Court's near-absolute refusal to attack pretextuality, 3 to infer re-
pressive purpose from paltriness of speech-independent purpose, 4
61 It may be that restrictions on nude dancing are defensible because the dancers ought
not be regarded as volunteers, but that was not the Court's reasoning in Barnes. See Mac-
Kinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 179-83 (cited in note 44) (discussing coercion of women
acting or modeling for pornography production). See also New York v Ferber, 458 US 747,
756-60 (1982) (justifying restriction on production and sale of child pornography as a child-
protection measure). But see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv L Rev
1849, 1915-17 (1987) (discussing "double bind" created for women by disallowing com-
modification of personal sexuality).
62 1 know that this was not the official story in Barnes, 111 S Ct 2456, but it is a kind of
story that Barnes and its ilk (O'Brien, 391 US 367; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789;
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young, 427 US at 73; Clark v Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 US 288 (1984) (no sleeping in public park)) apparently make per-
fectly admissible. The official story in Barnes is threefold: First, the town may claim (or, to
be more precise, the Court may claim on the town's behalf) a general moral interest in the
prevention of nudity, even among volunteers within the walls of private establishments if
those establishments are also "places of public accomodation." Second, this general moral
interest is quite unconnected to any concerns about communication. Third, this interest is
quite sufficient to override any consequential suppression of expression. Neither the Court's
analysis in Barnes nor that of Justice Scalia's concurrence purports to rest on the "low-
value" status of dancing, or of nudity, as a form of expression.
63 See O'Brien, 391 US 367. For criticism, see Frank I. Michelman, Saving Old Glory:
On Constitutional Iconography, 42 Stan L Rev 1337, 1345 & n 28, 1353 (1990) (citing prior
critics).
6" See O'Brien, 391 US 367; Michelman, 42 Stan L Rev at 1345 & n 28 (cited in note
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to subordinate moral majoritarianism to expressive freedom, 5 or
to demand genuinely weighty, speech-independent reasons for re-
fusing accommodations"6 and declining less restrictive alterna-
tives." Yet, whatever faults one may find with the Court's han-
dling of the direct/incidental distinction, it is hard to withstand
the inevitability of the distinction itself. The distinction is plainly
designed to preserve lawmaker discretion against the otherwise
boundless, trumping power of free expression rights.68 It responds
to a fear that if laws were rendered highly constitutionally suspect
by their side-effects on speech, then either too many laws designed
for good and proper ends would go under, or else courts (in order
to avoid that consequence) would have to engage in too much ad
hoc "balancing" of policies and values. 9
Clearly, there are conflicting pulls on First Amendment doc-
trine-a pull toward distrust, and a pull toward something like its
opposite. We can call this opposite confidence, or we can call it
resignation. Whichever, its gist remains the same: there is no fu-
ture in establishing governments for purposes of looking after cer-
tain matters without trusting them to do it; establishment is en-
trustment. ° This simple truth does not eradicate distrust from
constitutional thought or argument; what it does is deflate-or
demythify-distrust, and hold it to the status of a factor in (as
Frederick Schauer says) a calculus.71
But, you ask: If across-the-board distrust of government is not
what drives the limited-government side-the libertarian bill-of-
15 See Barnes, 111 S Ct 2456. Compare Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 545-55 (1961)
(Harlan dissenting), in which Justice Harlan, prefiguring Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US
479 (1965), would have subordinated moral majoritarianism to the "fundamental" right of
marital privacy.
'" See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288.
17 See O'Brien, 391 US 367. At the very least, the Court should demand justification
beyond abstract rule-formalist prudence or the nuisance to administrators or lawmakers of
having to draw lines and distinguish cases.
68 The distinction may well be traceable to contributions from committed civil libertari-
ans. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil & Pub Aff 204, 209
(1972); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amend-
ment, 21 UCLA L Rev 29, 38-46 (1973); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv L Rev
1482, 1496-1502 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-2 at 1496-
1502 (Foundation, 2d ed 1988).
"9 See generally John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
tutional Law, 79 Yale L J 1205 (1970).
70 This argument is advanced and examined, with characteristically engaging subtlety,
by John Dunn, Trust and Political Agency, in Dunn, Interpreting Political Responsibility
26, 26-44 (Princeton, 1990).
' See Frederick Schauer, The Calculus of Distrust, 77 Va L Rev 653 (1991).
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rights side-of our constitutionalism, 72 and its support by judicial
review, then what does drive it? The answer lies in substance. It
lies, that is, in not imagining distrust as a universal solvent 73 indif-
ferent to substance.7 4
American constitutionalists have, for better or for worse, al-
ways focused their attentions on the problem of the state. It is
state power that our constitutional law has been concerned to es-
tablish, organize, motivate, direct, and restrain. There are certain
kinds of effects that, all other things being equal, Americans have
preponderantly wanted accomplished by governmental power: for
example, creation, maintenance, and defense of a continentally in-
tegrated, commercial republic. At the same time, there are certain
other kinds of effects that, all other things being equal, Americans
have preponderantly wanted not accomplished by governmental
power: suppression of communication, for example. Finally, there
is a residual category of what we may call "contingently wanted"
effects, those that Americans have expected sitting governments to
pursue when and as those governments have judged it opportune
to pursue them: for example, the kinds of regulatory enhancements
and adjustments of the values of liberties that I sketched earlier.
When the only available rationale for a burden or restraint on
expressive action depends on the speech-restrictive effect itself,
then governmental power is being used-with identifiable, impor-
tant exceptions-to accomplish an unwanted effect. Not so when
the restrictive effect on speech is "incidental." Then the law may
be accomplishing other effects that we expect our governments to
pursue, including, as I have argued, certain adjustments and en-
hancements of the values of liberties. The calculus of distrust sim-
ply must allow some room for such adjustments. How much room
is uncertain. The functionalist case for variable judicial respect of
government discretion remains, in that sense, vague and perhaps
uneasy. It is nevertheless a coherent case, it is rational, it is tradi-
tional, and it contains grounds for methodically differentiating how
reviewing courts treat expressive, proprietary, and economic
liberties.
72 Some recent scholarship seeks to revive a non-libertarian, pro-popularist strain in the
Bill of Rights, but not by denying that the libertarian element is also there. See generally
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131 (1991).
Epstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 48 (cited in note 2).
' If "substance" encompasses the kinds of considerations I have marshalled in support
of varying judicial treatments of different liberties, then distrust theory, carried to the point
of swamping those considerations, is a flight from substance. Compare Richard A. Epstein,
Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 Yale L J 1633 (1988).
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C. Impossible Assimilation?
Whether Professor Epstein's alternative is likewise coherent is
subject to question. The distinction between "direct" and "inci-
dental" restrictions on expression is, after all, not a secondary de-
tail of constitutional law. It is a crucial, organizing feature. It is a
feature evidently designed to preserve the validity of a great deal
of regulation whose speech-suppressive effects might otherwise
render it highly constitutionally suspect. If constitutional protec-
tion of proprietary and economic liberties is truly to follow the
freedom-of-speech model, must it not contain an analogously per-
missive, preservative feature? But what could that feature possibly
be? (Someone please tell us, what is the intelligible distinction be-
tween a "direct" and an "incidental" restriction on property?7 5)
A direct restriction of speech is one for which there is no plau-
sible goal apart from restricting communication. By analogy, a di-
rect restriction of property would be one for which there is no
plausible goal apart from restricting how people use and enjoy
their lawful possessions. But then to say that direct restrictions of
property are strictly scrutinizable would make every bit of govern-
ment regulatory action presumptively unconstitutional. 6 (Someone
7' Baker has offered a possible response in the form of his proposed distinction between
laws that "allocate" liberty and those that "restrict" liberty. See Baker, 134 U Pa L Rev at
785-815 (cited in note 13). Clear as this distinction may be in conception, it might prove
extremely contestable in practice. On Baker's own understanding of it, it is orders of magni-
tude too permissive for Epstein's purposes.
7' Professor Epstein suggests that a piece of legislation's non-redistributive nature
could be demonstrated either by an explicit, special compensation payment or by a demon-
stration that the action carries its own implicit, in-kind compensations to those on whom it
also imposes burdens. Epstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 51-53 (cited in note 2).
These responses, however, do not meet the objection I am raising. First, some govern-
ment actions are prompted and justified by distributive considerations, in such a way that
requiring compensation would defeat their purposes. Second, against what baseline of pre-
existing value are we to determine whether a government action is redistributive (wholly
aside from any attendant compensation, explicit or implicit)? The strictest view would be
that any legislatively or judicially announced deviation from positive law, or from the com-
mon law as of some fixed date, is a prima facie compensable taking, at least insofar as it
causes a decrement in market value. Such a doctrine, I have argued, would often defeat the
ends of justice. If, alternatively, we are to determine baseline values by methods sufficiently
attentive to cultural evolution and expectations of legal dynamism to be consonant with
justice, then it is unclear why that work is better entrusted to judges than to ordinary
lawmakers.
In general, it seems that distrust-based justifications for judicial review have, to date,
been remarkably inattentive to the fact that judges, too, are plausible objects of distrust.
Schauer signals a welcome corrective to this silence. See Schauer, 77 Va L Rev 653 (cited in
note 71). See also Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of
the Law (Free Press, 1990); Ingber, 1984 Duke L J at 30 (cited in note 19) ("Members of the
judiciary, responsible for upholding the values protected by the first amendment, are not
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please give us an example of a regulatory goal that operates inde-
pendently of curtailing anyone's use of any of their property.) The
preservative side of the "direct"/"incidental" distinction would be
missing.
Take a simple example. Today, it seems that sweeping anti-
billboard laws are virtually exempt from First Amendment scru-
tiny, despite the substantial suppression of communication they ef-
fect, because they also plausibly serve aesthetic and (it is some-
times said) safety goals. Such goals are considered to be
independent of any concern on the government's part about what
people say or communicate to one another. Such goals, however,
cannot possibly be considered independent of governmental con-
cern about how people use their property holdings; how people use
their property is exactly what such regulations are about. They are,
then, direct regulations of property, although not of speech. Are
they, on that account, constitutionally suspect? To say so is di-
rectly to undercut what in free speech analysis is a major pre-
mise-speech-independent considerations of public amenity or
safety are not only legitimate but redemptive justifications for reg-
ulations that also restrict expression. Thus, the preservative side of
the "direct"/"incidental" distinction would have vanished. 77 The
property-restrictive effects of ordinary regulations, which in free
speech analysis are their ticket to constitutional salvation, are by
Professor Epstein's proposal transmuted into stigmata of constitu-
tional sin.
In sum, the idea of having courts approach proprietary and
economic rights with the same formulaic kit of analyses and
"tests" that they use in free speech cases seems bound for massive
immune from the same processes of socialization and indoctrination that predispose the
general public to certain perspectives."); Radin, Regimes (cited in note 39) (remarking that
judges who understand their role to be that of preventing socially costly legislative rent-
seeking "have yet to face the full implications of the idea that their own activities, as indi-
viduals and as government actors, should also be interpreted as rent-seeking").
" This trouble cannot be avoided by fiddling with the "level" of judicial scrutiny of
government's justifications for laws infringing on proprietary or economic liberties-for ex-
ample, by using "intermediate" rather than "strict" scrutiny, demanding that the ques-
tioned regulation "substantially" advance an "important" interest, rather than that it be
"necessary" to a "compelling" interest. Any level of judicial scrutiny between quasi-auto-
matic approval (toothless rationality review) and quasi-automatic invalidation (fatal-in-fact
strict scrutiny) involves the court in what is loosely called "balancing"--that is, in judgmen-
tal second-guessing of the lawmakers' ostensible appraisals of policy and justice. So to
choose such an intermediate level of judicial involvement is already, in effect, to concede
that the regulation in question does truly present legitimate questions of policy and justice
that someone ought conscientiously and responsibly to resolve. It is thus, again, to invite the
question of why such work is better entrusted to judges than to ordinary lawmakers.
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conceptual disorder. My argument has identified two sources for
this disorder. The first is failing to take account of relevant differ-
ences among the ways in which various classes of liberties function
in American society and what they signify. The other is overesti-
mating the degree to which distrust of lawmakers is or logically can
be thought to be the preemptively dominant theme of American
constitutional thought and practice.
